l:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial classes. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills would enable individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of the parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominences. However, they would help to supplement relationships which the social order might neglect. The sucess of organizations of this sort served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system. Most

marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide. 596 182

Just as sex, age, and generation determined an individual's status within the family, so did these factors determine his behavior and position in the community and the world at large. An additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society. 554 596

Authority and dominance were the province of males. Women might, and occasionally did, exercise overt leadership. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however. In modern times at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed. 596

Age was honored relatively and absolutely. Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China, age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis. 888

Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official career was usually dependent 554 596

←on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the dan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the examinations was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

554 596

C. Political Role

To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

529 577

Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaining peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It

618

of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern But for the masses of the population submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

In traditional China "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu).[35] One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethnical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the role which society assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" [tiu mien-tzu] . The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family's, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations.

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual

35. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Vailley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.

concern for "face," intensified by community pressure, stifled individual initiative and made creative people into timid conformists who sacrificed all for the preservation of superficial prestige in the community. This, they held, worked against China's successful adjustment to the modern world. 554

The Communists have built on this sort of criticism and dissatisfaction and, in seeking to release individual energies for the purposes of the Communist state, have made a frontal attack on the notion of "face." Mao sarcastically describes the attitude they seek to destroy: "Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or failing to make any clear decision, speaking about [the error] in allusions in order to preserve harmony and unity...." [36]

The Communists single out for public recognition individuals who have ruthlessly battered their way toward one of the Communist goals with utter disregard for "face," their own or others'. They praise children who have denounced their father, which, in older China would have been condemned as utter destruction of the family's "face." Communist writings indicate that the older attitudes have been hard to overcome. Liu Shao-ch'i is fulminating against them when he says: "Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is utterly wrong." [37] Obviously the universal "struggle meetings"

36. Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," written in 1937, translation in Compton, op. cit., pp. 184-86.

37. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Inner-Party Struggle," Current Background, No. 105, Aug. 5, 1951, p. 5.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

for personal criticism and self-criticism in the presence of the group are destructive of the old feeling for "face." Indeed the leadership may regard them as one of the principal devices for the complete elimination of this traditional attitude.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Festival in Czechoslovakia in 1951. The Concentration Camp at Shang-yao, which was made in 1951, describes the life of the "patriotic people" in the Kuomintang concentration camp and, according to the Communist reviewers, successfully "demonstrates the collective heroism" of the Communists under duress. When the rural production drive was about to begin in 1954, the movie Good Harvest was timed to be shown to the peasants during the festivities of the lunar New Year, in order to emphasize the importance of increasing the output of the land. The People on the Grassland is a movie about the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Sound tracks in the Mongol and Uigur languages have been made so that this picture may be circulated among the ethnic minorities. 546

It should be mentioned that the Communists have elevated the social position of actors and actresses from that of "artist." Actors and actesses have their own organizations in the capital, and are invited to take part in the deliberation of new policies pertaining to their profession "under the leadership of the Party." 546 534

III. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

A. Painting and the Plastic Arts

Painting and plastic arts are largely utilitarian in China today. The utilitarian spirit puts them either in the realm of propaganda, or craftsmanship. As propaganda, they become extremely derivative and stereotyped; as craftsmanship, they utilize local characteristics and traditional skills, although they sometimes appear to be unrestrainedly florid and pretentious. The entries for the Kwangtung Art Workers' 532